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Introduction
During the crisis-prone decade of the nineties, currency boards proved to be remarkably robust. Even in Argentina, where the currency board collapsed in 2002, not only the breakdown itself, but also the fact that the currency board could survive such a long time in spite of large strains requires an explanation. In this context, the question arises as to what constitutes the difference between a currency board and a standard peg system and under what circumstances a currency board has a credibility advantage.
A currency board is characterised by a fixed exchange rate to a stable anchor currency and full coverage of the monetary base by foreign reserves 1 . It requires a long-term commitment by policy makers and is usually introduced by law (which also specifies the fixed exchange rate). The main advantage of a currency board is the gain in credibility.
The monetary base is changed only through buying and selling the anchor currency at the fixed rate. Thus, the trilemma that it is not possible to maintain a fixed exchange rate, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy at the same time is solved by clearly abstaining from monetary independence. Moreover, the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved, as it is not possible for the monetary authorities to create surprise inflation.
However, the gain in credibility of monetary policy relies on the credibility of the currency board itself, which is, of course, not complete. A currency board does not break down because it runs out of reserves necessary to intervene on the exchange rate market, as may be the case in a standard peg system. But it can be abolished if the costs of maintaining it -for example in case of a recession, a debt crisis or problems within the banking sector -exceed its advantages.
Although currency boards have been discussed thoroughly, there is not much literature that theoretically analyses the difference between a currency board and a standard fixed exchange rate regime. One of the few papers that try to model this difference is Chang and Velasco (2000). They characterise a currency board by the full coverage of the monetary base, which excludes a run on the central bank's reserves that is possible with a standard peg. As Chang and Velasco consider opportunity costs of holding reserves, but do not model any possible disadvantages of flexible exchange rates, their conclusion that a flexible exchange rate is the optimal regime is no surprise. A different approach to capture the difference between a currency board and a standard peg is used by Oliva 1 A thorough discussion of currency boards can be found in Williamson (1995) and Ho (2002 price stability by choosing between these two exchange rate systems. They emphasise that a currency board constitutes a long term commitment and assume that it can only be abolished in the second period of their two period model, whereas with a standard peg a realignment in response to a supply shock is possible in either period. In contrast, Irwin (2004) assumes that the policy maker can abolish a currency board without any time lag, but that the costs of doing so are particularly high. The central result is that "the combination of incomplete information and persistence of unemployment can lead to a build up of pressure on a currency board system to the extent that it does collapse, even where the true devaluation cost is very high".
In this paper, we take up the idea of Oliva et al. (2001) that a currency board cannot be abolished overnight, but we do so more consistently. A currency board is established by law, and leaving it requires a political process including preceding public discussion.
However, this feature is not captured adequately in Oliva et al. (2001) as they allow for a sudden exit out of the system in the second period
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. Repealing a currency board takes time, implying that it is hardly possible to generate a surprise. When Argentina finally left its currency board, this had been largely expected.
In our model, the currency board is characterised by the assumption that -in contrast to the case of a standard peg -its abolition will be known in advance. The currency board can only be left if this was announced earlier
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. Thus, when expectations on inflation are formed, it is known whether the currency board will still be in place in the next period. Therefore, the currency board completely solves the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. Nevertheless, announcing the abolition of the currency board may make sense in case of a lasting misalignment.
Pressure to change the exchange rate emerges from asymmetric shocks that require an adjustment of the real exchange rate, i.e. from stochastic shocks on the purchasing power parity (PPP ) (Berger et al. 2001 ). These shocks may for example arise from differing business cycles. They may also reflect exchange rate movements between the anchor currency and third countries. Although the Argentinean currency board ultimately collapsed because of unresolved budget problems, the sharp devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1999 and the strength of the US$ in the years 2000 until mid 2002 contributed to Argentina's difficulties and help to explain the time of the breakdown.
The PPP -shocks are assumed to be autocorrelated, meaning that a shock has lasting effects. After observing the shock of the first period, the policy maker will decide whether to initiate the process of repealing the currency board. If the shock is large, he knows that with a high probability the misalignment will continue in the following period. But if the currency board is abolished, the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy reemerges.
In contrast, in a standard peg regime the policy maker can make use of an escape clause after observing the shock in each period. He can respond to a large shock, but he is also tempted to create surprise inflation. As a result, a currency board arrangement is more credible than a standard-peg regime, if the time inconsistency problem is the dominant one, whereas the peg is maintained with a higher probability, if the ability to react to future shocks is more important. This paper is organised as follows: in the next section we develop our two-period model. In section 3 we consider the regime of a floating exchange rate, which will be in operation if the fixed exchange rate is abolished. Section 4 analyses the policy options under a currency board. We derive conditions under which the currency board will be maintained and show in which situations it will be abandoned. In section 5 the behavior of the policy maker in a standard fixed exchange rate system is considered. Section 6 compares the credibility of the two fixed exchange rate regimes considered. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model
We consider a two-period model of a small open economy that has a time inconsistency problem of monetary policy modelled as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and in Barro and Gordon (1983) . In each period t, the deviation from natural output y t is given by a standard Lucas supply function
Output depends on unanticipated inflation (π t − π e t ), where π t denotes inflation in period t and π e t is the inflation rate expected by the private sector. Expectations are formed rationally. The inflation rate and the exchange rate are linked by the stochastic purchasing power parity (PPP)
3 where π * t denotes foreign inflation, e t the percentage change of the nominal exchange rate in period t, and φ t is a random shock (Berger et al. 2001 ).
The shock φ t is autocorrelated
and it is assumed that initially there is no inherited shock, i.e. φ 1 = u 1 . Normalizing the foreign inflation π * to zero, equation (2) can be rewritten as
The monetary authorities' loss in period t is given by the function
where k is the target output-level of the policy maker, which is higher than the natural output level, meaning that the desired deviation from natural output is positive. The higher k is, the larger is the policy maker's incentive to create unexpected inflation i.e. the larger is the time inconsistency problem. The relative weight of inflation in the lossfunction is given by θ. In addition, there are political costs c that arise when the fixed exchange rate is given up under a peg regime or when the currency board arrangement is abandoned. These political costs can either be interpreted as reputation costs or as costs caused by political institutions in society (Lohmann 1992 ). δ is a dummy variable, which equals one when leaving the peg or the currency board and equals zero otherwise.
Using equations (1), (4) and (5), the loss function is given by
In our model, the essential difference between a currency board and a standard peg lies in the procedure of abolishing the particular system. A currency board, characterised by its establishment by law and the complete renunciation of individual monetary policy, can only be repealed, if this was announced one period in advance, i.e. before the private sector made its expectations on inflation. In contrast, monetary authorities can leave the fixed exchange rate in a far more flexible way after the shock was observed. The sequence of the model is depicted in the following figure.
- Figure 1 : Sequence of the model
Expectations π e t have to be formed before the shock φ t is observed. Actual inflation is determined by the purchasing power parity (equation 4) if the exchange rate is fixed, and it is optimally set by the policy maker in response to the shock if the exchange rate is flexible or the fixed exchange rate is abandoned. In our two-period model, the decision whether to repeal the currency board in the second period or not is announced in the first period at time ♦ before the private sector forms expectations π e 2 . In the case of a standard peg, the fixed exchange rate can be abandoned after observing the shock which would actually be possible in the first as well as in the second period. However, we assume that the fixed exchange rate is maintained in the first period and the decision whether to defend it or not is considered at time in the second period. This could be justified by the fact that a standard peg has some commitment value, too, and cannot be abolished immediately after its adoption. The more important reason for making the assumption is, however, that a meaningful comparison of the credibility of a currency board and a standard peg has to be based on a single decision whether to give up the fixed exchange rate or not in both systems. If the currency board can only be abolished at one point of time, but for the standard peg abolition is considered both in period 1 and period 2, a statement that an abolition of the standard peg is more probable will be irrelevant.
3 Free Float Regime
In our model the process of repealing a currency board system takes time and has to be announced one period in advance. In this case, the policy maker will set the inflation rate (and thus the exchange rate) in period 2 optimally, and this policy will be taken into account when expectations are formed. This regime amounts to a free float in period 2 that will briefly be analysed in this section.
Consider the loss in period 2 (equation 6)
The monetary authorities can freely choose inflation. By minimizing L 2 , inflation in period 2 equals
As the private sector's expectations are rational, it follows that
and thus
Using equations (1),(4) and (7) yields the equilibrium values for period t
The superscript f denotes "free float". With flexible exchange rates, the P P P -shock φ 2 is fully absorbed by the change of the exchange rate e f 2 . The inflation rate π f 2 is independent of φ 2 , but depends on the size of the time inconsistency problem k. In equilibrium, output equals natural output. The resulting loss in period 2 is given by
Note that L 2 does not depend on the shock φ 2 , but only
Policy Options under a Currency Board
The policy maker has to announce one period in advance (at time ♦ in figure 1) whether to maintain or to abolish the currency board in the next period. Thus, the decision depends on the expected second period loss of the two cases, which are compared to each other in the following analysis.
Currency board maintained over both periods
First, we consider the case of a currency board regime that is kept over both periods;
i.e. the monetary authorities do not announce the abolition of the currency board in period 1, implying that e 2 = 0 irrespective of the shock in period 2. Using equations (3) and (4), the second period's inflation rate is given by
meaning that inflation depends only on the shock φ 2 . Thus the expected inflation π
Expected and actual inflation differ by the new shock u 2 . Substituting ηφ 1 for π e 2 in equation (6) yields a second period loss of
Equilibrium values are given by
As the exchange rate cannot be changed, e cc 2 equals zero. Thus, π cc 2 is independent of k and the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved at the cost of having no policy option to counteract φ 2 . Equilibrium output depends on the realization of the unexpected part of φ 2 , the new shock u 2 . The expectation of period 2 loss, contingent on first period information, is given by
The threat of a large expected second period shock, represented by a high variance σ 2 u and a high inherited shock φ 1 , leads to a high expected second period loss, as the policy maker has no options to counteract the shock. This effect is reinforced by a large time inconsistency problem of monetary policy, represented by a high level of k.
Currency board being abolished after the first period
In this subsection, we consider the case that the government has adopted a currency board regime, but announces its abolition at the end of the first period and introduces a free float system for period 2. Note that e 1 equals zero and the monetary authorities can set π 2 (and therefore e 2 ) optimally after observing φ 2 .
The 
Maintaining or leaving the currency board arrangement
The decision whether to maintain or abandon the currency board takes place in the first period before the private sector forms its inflation expectations for the second period. The policy maker will decide to maintain the currency board, if the expected second period loss of leaving it exceeds the expected second period loss of perpetuating the currency
Using equation (15) and (16), this condition is equivalent to
The inequality shows that the decision whether to keep the currency board after the first period or not depends on the absolute value of the shock realization φ 1 . The currency board is maintained for small shocks, whereas a large shock φ 1 prompts the policy maker to announce its abolition. A large time inconsistency problem of monetary policy -reflected by a high target output k -makes the inequality more likely to hold. The policy maker will continue the currency board in spite of a large shock requiring an adjustment of the real exchange rate, as an abolition of the currency board will revive a huge inflation bias.
This effect is reinforced by the political costs c cf of abolishing the currency board.
In contrast, a high variance σ 2 u of the PPP -shock makes the interval in which the fixed exchange rate is defended smaller, and it is possible that the right hand side of inequality (18) becomes negative which would mean that the currency board would be 8 abolished irrespective of the shock (or it would not be a suitable system from the very beginning and would never be introduced). The higher σ 2 u , the more important it is for the policy maker to be able to react to a large possible shock φ 2 . A high autocorrelation of the shocks φ t , represented by a large η, decreases the range of shock realizations for which the currency board is maintained. In this case, the first period shock contains much information about the second period shock, implying that a large first period shock makes the need for large further adjustments in the second period more likely. If η is interpreted as a degree of price stickiness (see footnote 4), a currency board is more likely to be maintained in case of a high price flexibility, whereas a relatively large η increases the probability of announcing its abolition.
Standard Peg
To ensure an unbiased comparison of a standard peg and a currency board, only the policy maker's decision of the second period is considered (see section 2). After observing the shock φ 2 , monetary authorities decide whether to maintain or to abandon the peg. In this section, the range of realizations of φ 2 in which monetary authorities would defend the peg is derived. Multiple equilibria for π e 2 may occur in this case. However, we will derive conditions sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Policy decisions under a peg
The second period loss when leaving the peg L pf 2 is given by the term
which equals the second period loss in a free float system (equation 10) plus the political costs c pf . If the monetary authorities decide to maintain the peg after observing
The fixed exchange rate is defended if the second period loss in case of leaving exceeds the loss in case of maintaining the peg, i.e. if
Isolating φ 2 in the above equation yields the result that the exchange rate remains fixed if and only if
where
The peg is maintained if the shock φ 2 lies in an interval of length 2 (3), the lower and upper boundary of the interval in which the peg is defended can be expressed in terms of the new shock u 2 ,
The policy maker devalues, if the new shock u 2 is below u i.e. the (maximum) length of the interval in which the policy maker maintains the fixed exchange rate is smaller than the length of the support of u 2 . Thus, independent of the realization of φ 1 , the probability of abandoning the peg is always positive. The probability of defending the fixed exchange rate is a measure of the credibility of the exchange rate system. In case that the whole interval [u , which is an upper boundary of the credibility of the fixed exchange rate system in all cases.
We use this upper boundary for the comparison of the credibility of a currency board and a standard peg in section 6. This way, the standard peg appears in a favorable light, and the credibility gains of a currency board can only be underestimated. Therefore, when pointing out situations in which a currency board has a credibility advantage, we will remain on the safe side.
Unique and multiple equilibria
The focus of this subsection is the position of the interval in which the peg is defended.
The centre of that interval depends on π e 2 , which is determined by rational expectations, i.e. π e 2 = E 1 (π 2 ). The expected value of π 2 is given by
which is of course a function of the expected inflation π e 2 . As in Obstfeld (1996) , the existence of an equilibrium is ensured, but multiple equilibria may occur when determining π (corresponding to case (iii) in the appendix), the equilibrium is unique.
In this case
implying that In the latter case it is not excluded that expected inflation π e 2 is negative. However, a non-negative inherited shock ηφ 1 continues to ensure that the expected inflation rate is positive. A negative π e 2 may occur if φ 1 is sufficiently negative, the persistence parameter η is high, the time inconsistency problem is small and case (iv) is the relevant one. The intuition is that in this situation the conditional expectation on the inflation rate given that the peg is defended may be negative (reflecting that on average, a real depreciation is required), and due to the small k inflation will be low if the peg is abandoned.
If π e 2 is negative, Γ(π e 2 , k), the centre of the interval of period 2's shocks φ 2 in which the peg is defended (equation 22) may also be negative 10 . Nevertheless, a positive Γ(π e 2 , k) may be considered as the normal case.
Comparison of peg and currency board
In the previous sections, we derived the ranges of the PPP -shock in which the particular regimes are maintained. In section 4 (see equation 18), the condition to keep the currency board was derived as
Assuming as in section 5, that the new shock u t is uniformly distributed on [−A, A], the length of the interval is proportional to the probability of maintaining the currency board and can also be interpreted as a measure of credibility. This probability is given by
From section 5 (equation 22 and 27), we know that the fixed exchange rate is defended in the second period, if
leading to the upper boundary for the probability of defending the peg given by
10 The case of π 11 Of course, the probability must be contained in [0, 1] . If the expression exceeds one, the probability equals one; if the term under the square root is negative, the probability equals zero. Note that σ , this shift amounts to an inflation bias under a standard peg that does not exist in a currency board system. A standard peg will rather be abolished in case of a negative φ 2 requiring a real depreciation than in case of φ 2 > 0 which leads to a positive inflation when the exchange rate remains fixed.
Moreover, the credibility of the peg hinges on the political costs c pf of abandoning it, as without these costs, the probability of maintaining the peg shrinks to zero (equation 29). In contrast, the credibility of a currency board system is not exclusively based on the (28) becomes negative. In this case, the ability to offset shocks promptly is more important for the policy makers than avoiding the inflation that results from the time inconsistency problem.
Moreover, the credibility of the currency board depends negatively on η, the parameter representing the autocorrelation of the PPP -shocks as the decision of abolishing the currency board is based on the expectation on the second period shock E 1 (φ 2 ) = ηφ 1 . In contrast, the credibility of a standard peg does not depend on η, as the decision whether to abolish the peg is made after observing φ 2 and does not depend on the degree of shock persistence.
For further comparison of the credibility of the two exchange rate regimes, it is assumed that the political costs are equal in both regimes 
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which is the case if
i.e., if the length of the interval of maintenance is larger in the case of a currency board than under a fixed exchange rate regime
14
. The expression can be rewritten as
This inequality shows that when the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is large (as represented by a high k) a currency board is more credible than a standard peg regime. In the case of a currency board arrangement, the monetary authorities are tied by law to keep the fixed parity, when its abolition was not announced in the previous period and it is not possible to create surprise inflation. Thus, the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved, which is not the case in a standard peg system. High political costs c also increase the credibility of a currency board relative to a standard peg, as
The peg regime achieves a credibility advantage vis-a-vis a currency board, when σ 2 u becomes so high that the ability to react to shocks is more relevant than solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy -higher shock variances lead to a higher probability that large shocks may hit the economy, and hence it can be important to be able to react immediately to the shock by choosing an optimal e 2 (and thus π 2 ), instead of having to keep a misalignment over one period.
Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the issue of whether a currency board arrangement is indeed more credible than a standard peg system, and what exactly may make it more credible. The essential feature of a currency board captured in our model is its longerterm nature. The currency board can only be abolished if this has been announced one period in advance -reflecting the fact that a currency board can only be abandoned after a time-consuming political process. As a result, it is not possible to create surprise inflation, and the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved completely. In contrast, a standard peg does not solve the time inconsistency problem, because of the permanently existing escape clause from the fixed exchange rate. The policy maker can abandon the peg overnight, and he is only deterred from doing so by the political costs of exiting the exchange rate system.
The comparison of both exchange rate regimes in section 6 shows that the currency board is more credible -in the sense of having a higher probability of being maintained -if the time inconsistency problem is the dominant one in the economy considered. The threat of high future inflation will prevent the policy maker from starting the process of abolishing the currency board unless there is a large persisting misalignment. In contrast, the currency board is more likely to be abandoned than a standard peg if shocks with a high volatility constitute the dominant problem, i.e. if the flexibility to be able to react immediately to future shocks is of paramount importance. Summarizing, its capability of solving the time inconsistency problem makes the currency board credible, but only as long as this advantage is not outweighed by the need for stabilization of shocks occurring with a high volatility.
Appendix (to section 5.2)
In the following analysis, we investigate thoroughly the expected inflation rate in the case of a fixed exchange rate system and derive sufficient conditions under which multiple equilibria can be excluded.
As 
The solution equals the free-float equilibrium rate, as monetary authorities will always revalue.
• Case (ii): u
lies partly in the support of u 2 . In this case the expected value of π 2 is given by Graph of E 1 (π 2 ) as a function of π e 2
The function E 1 (π 2 ) is defined by cases. As u 
Conditions for a unique equilibrium under a peg
In the following section, we derive two conditions excluding the possibility of multiple equilibria under a peg.
A) From the description of the graph of E 1 (π 2 ) it is clear that the equilibrium is unique, if the function E 1 (π 2 ) cuts the bisecting line in the range of case (iii).
B) Moreover, we can exclude the existence of multiplicities if the slope of E 1 (π 2 ) does not exceed one in the two cases (ii) and (iv), too. We take up case (iv) for further examination, the argument in case (ii) is analogous.
The first derivative of E 1 (π 2 |case (iv)) is given by 
The boundary between the ranges of the cases (iv) and (v) is given by 
If that boundary lies left of the point where
